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 A novel risk-based life cycle assessment methodology is proposed 
 The novel methodology consider safety and environmental risk during the process life 
time 




Using the emissions produced during the entire life-cycle of a fuel or a product, Life-cycle 
assessment (LCA) is an effective technique widely used to estimate environmental impacts. 
However, most of the conventional LCA methods consider the impacts of voluntary releases 
such as discharged toxic substances and overlook involuntary risks such as risk of accidents 




hazardous materials such as fuels could be quite significant and if ignored may result in 
inaccurate LCA. The present study aims to develop a methodology for accident risk-based life 
cycle assessment (ARBLCA) of fossil fuels by considering both the voluntary and involuntary 
risks. The application of the developed methodology is demonstrated for liquefied natural gas 
(LNG) and heavy fuel oil (HFO) as fuels of a hypothetical power plant. Adopting a Bayesian 
network approach, the comparative analysis of the fuels helps an analyst not only overcome data 
uncertainty but also to identify holistically greener and safer fuel options. 
 
Keywords: Risk Analysis; Life Cycle Analysis; Risk-based LCA; Accident Analysis; 
Product Selection 
1. Introduction 
In recent decades, rapid industrial development has led to steady growth in global energy 
consumption. Meanwhile, the availability and well-controlled nature of fossil fuels have made 
them popular among energy consumers. Nevertheless, the combustion of fossil fuels results in 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions to the atmosphere, which consequently poses one of the 
greatest environmental threats in our time, that is, global warming. The average temperature of 
the Earth has risen between 0.4 and 0.8 °C over the past 100 years, and could increase by about 
1.4 to 5.8 °C by the year 2100 [1]. This issue has raised questions about which fossil fuel is 
cleaner and has the least impact on the environment. Among fossil fuels, natural gas (NG) is 
believed to be a cleaner fuel since its combustion emits much lower GHGs than is emitted by oil 
and coal. Having the lowest carbon content of any fossil fuels, NG releases up to 50% less CO2 
than coal and much lesser CO2, Nitrogen oxide (NOx), Sulfur dioxide (SO2), mercury (Hg), and 
particulate matters (PM) than oil and coal [2,3]. 
Less emission from combustion, however, does not tell the full story. NG primarily consists of 
methane (CH4) which is a potent GHG and is more powerful than CO2. Inevitable leakage of NG 
which can occur in different stages through its life-cycle results in significant GHG emissions [3]. 
Life-Cycle assessment (LCA) is a technique for systematic evaluation of the environmental 
impacts of a product or process throughout its entire life cycle, from raw material extraction to 




Howarth et al. [4,5] studied the life-cycle emissions from shale gas production. Their study 
indicated that conventional gas has almost no advantage over coal whereas shale gas has higher 
life-cycle GHG emissions than do coal and oil, due largely to methane emissions during the 
extraction process. Hultman et al. [6] compared the life-cycle GHG footprints of conventional 
gas, shale gas and coal in the electricity generation sector. The authors showed that the GHG 
impacts of shale gas are slightly higher than those of conventional gas, while those of both 
conventional and shale gases remain considerably lower than those of coal, under standard 
assumptions. Similar attempts have been made to compare life cycle GHG emissions of 
conventional and unconventional NG, compressed natural gas (CNG), coal, and diesel [7,8]. 
However, these studies have not considered the issue of LCA from a broader perspective. In 
other words, it is merely the impacts of discharged toxic substances (voluntary risks) that have 
been taken into account while other important impacts such as those associated with risk of 
accidents such as fires and explosions (involuntary risks) occurring during  the storage, 
production, process and transportation of fuels have been overlooked. This, in turn, can result in 
non-holistic and in some cases wrong decisions since an alternative with less environmental 
emissions (but more accidental risks) may seem less hazardous and thus preferable. Although 
there recently have been attempts to couple risk analysis and LCA to develop Life Cycle Risk 
Analysis (LCRA) methodologies [9-11], in none of them have the risks of abovementioned 
accidents have been taken into account. The present study aims to develop an Accident Risk-
based Life Cycle Assessment (ARBLCA) methodology not only to consider the impacts of toxic 
environmental discharges which are assessed in conventional LCA but also to quantify the risks 
of potential fires and explosions resulting from the leakage of fuels. In this paper, the developed 
methodology is described in Section 2; the application of the methodology is demonstrated in 
Section 3, where a comparative ARBLCA of liquefied natural gas (LNG) and heavy fuel oil 
(HFO) as fuels of a power plant is performed. Sections 4 and 5 are devoted to the results and the 
conclusions, respectively.  
2. Methodology 
The method proposed in this study for ARBLCA integrates two widely known techniques in 
design and operation decision-making, LCA and Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA), so as to 




The methodology includes four major phases: (i) forming a boundary for each life-cycle, (ii) 
performing LCA, (iii) hazard identification, and (iv) risk assessment. In order to compare the 
environmental impacts of different fuels, the outcomes of both LCA and QRA are converted to 
dollar value. Figure 1 illustrates a schematic diagram of ARBLCA methodology. 
 
2.1. Life-Cycle Assessment 
To holistically evaluate the environmental effects of a product or process, LCA should include 
raw materials extraction, manufacturing, processing, transportation, consumption, maintenance, 
recycling and waste disposal. Consequently, LCA can be used as an informed decision making 
tool to choose the alternative, whether products or processes, which is the least harmful to the 
environment. A typical LCA comprises several steps such as goal and scope determination, 
boundaries identification, inventory analysis, impact analysis, and improvement analysis [12].  
LCA methods are basically data intensive and time consuming. Thus, it is necessary to set the 
analysis’ goals and the boundaries in the first step in order to limit the analysis to important 
processes contributing the most to the LCA of a product. To this end, several LCA 
methodologies have been developed such as streamlined LCA [13] and input/output LCA [14, 15] 
which are less data intensive. Among the aforementioned steps, inventory analysis is of great 
importance as the quantities of both the required materials/energy and the environmental 
discharges (into air, water, and soil) are estimated. In the next step, the impact analysis, the 
effects of toxic discharges and emissions on the environment and on humans are assessed using 
exposure pathway modeling and dose-effect relationships. The aim of improvement analysis is to 
reduce the harmful effects by either reducing the amount of toxic discharges or devising 
appropriate safety measures [12]. It is worth noting that the application of risk analysis to LCA 
has been limited to the impact analysis or improvement analysis. 
In life-cycle assessment with regard to GHG emission, data gathered from direct measurements 
of an emission source seem to provide the most reliable information. However, due to the lack of 
such data, emission factors, in spite of their limitations, have been widely employed for 
emissions estimation [16]. 




emission) to the activity generating the emission. To estimate these emission factors, the weight 
of emission is usually divided by the unit weight, volume, distance, or duration of the activity of 
concern (i.e., the emitting activity); for example, kilograms of CO2 emitted per ton of coal 
burned. Such factors can be considered as the long-term average of available data yet with an 
acceptable level of quality obtained from all facilities in the emission source [16]. The general 
equation for emission estimation is: 
𝐸 = 𝐴. 𝐸𝐹. (1 −
𝐸𝑅
100
)          (1) 
where E is the emission; A is the activity rate; EF is the emission factor, and ER is the overall 
emission reduction efficiency [16]. 
 
 
2.2. Quantitative Risk Assessment 
In recent decades, accident risk assessment has become an integral part of decision making and 
design of process facilities dealing with large inventories of hazardous materials. Process plants 
are attributed with large inventories of hazardous materials along with many equipment items 
and complex pipeline networks. As a result, normal accidents which could easily be controlled or 
tolerated in other industrial facilities have the potential to turn into a catastrophe [17]. 
QRA focuses on quantifying the occurrence probability of envisaged accident scenarios. There 
are many techniques available, among which fault tree (FT), event tree (ET), and Bayesian 
network (BN) are very popular. Although conventional risk assessment methods have played an 
important role in identifying major risks and maintaining safety in process facilities, they have 
limitations which restrict their application to the risk analysis of complex and dependent systems. 
For example, conventional FT is not suitable for analyzing large systems, particularly if the 
system presents dependent failures [18-20].  




ET is an inductive technique widely used in QRA. ET is used to investigate possible outcomes 
originating from an initiating event. The probabilities of the potential outcomes can be estimated 
using the probability of the initiating event and the operation/failure probabilities of a sequence 
of other events (e.g., safety barriers) taking place usually in a chronological order. In safety 
analysis, ET is used to quantify the probability of possible accident scenarios resulting from the 
occurrence of a hazardous event. Considering an undesired event as the initiating event (IE) in an 
ET, there will be two branches at every top event (TE) or safety measure. These branches usually 
represent the failure/function or presence/absence of safety barriers or occurrence/non-
occurrence of TEs. Figure 3 illustrates a typical ET with an IE and two TEs. As a result, four 
outcomes or consequences could be expected, being C1, C2, C3, and C4. 
 
Having the probabilities of the IE and TEs, the probabilities of the consequences can readily be 
calculated. For example, the probabilities of C1-C4 in Figure 2 can be calculated as: 
𝑃(𝐶1) = 𝑃(𝐼𝐸). (1 − 𝑃(𝑇𝐸1)). (1 − 𝑃(𝑇𝐸2))       (2) 
𝑃(𝐶2) = 𝑃(𝐼𝐸). (1 − 𝑃(𝑇𝐸1)). 𝑃(𝑇𝐸2)       (3) 
𝑃(𝐶3) = 𝑃(𝐼𝐸). 𝑃(𝑇𝐸1). (1 − 𝑃(𝑇𝐸2))        (4) 
𝑃(𝐶1) = 𝑃(𝐼𝐸). 𝑃(𝑇𝐸1). 𝑃(𝑇𝐸2)        (5) 
In an ET usually the last consequence (e.g., C4 in Figure 2) has the lowest probability and the 
highest severity. ET has widely been used in accident modeling [21, 22], dynamic failure 
assessment [23], and dynamic risk assessment [24, 25]. 
 
2.2.2. Bayesian Network 
BN is a graphical technique for reasoning under uncertainty. BN is a directed acyclic graph [26] 
in which the nodes represent random variables, arcs denote causal relationships between the 
linked nodes, and conditional probability tables (CPTs) assigned to the nodes identify the type 




called parents whereas nodes with arcs directed into them are called children. In this regard, the 
nodes with no parent are called root nodes while the nodes without any children are called leaf 
nodes. Other nodes are called intermediate nodes. In order to run the BN quantitatively, marginal 
probabilities must be assigned to the root nodes while conditional probabilities should be 
assigned to the leaf and intermediate nodes. Based on the conditional dependencies, BN 
represents the joint probability distribution of variables 𝑃(𝑈) = 𝑃(𝐴1, 𝐴2, … , 𝐴𝑛) as: 
𝑃(𝑈) = ∏ 𝑃(𝐴𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 |𝑝𝑎(𝐴𝑖))         (6) 
where 𝑝𝑎(𝐴𝑖) is the parent set of 𝐴𝑖 [27]. BN employs Bayes rule to update the prior 
probabilities of events given new information, called evidence E, to calculate the updated or so-
called posterior probabilities. This new information usually becomes available during the 
operational life of a process [20]: 






                                                                                                      (7) 
In addition to the capability of BN in probability updating, the flexible structure of BN enables 
one to model a wide variety of accident scenarios. Many attempts have been made over the past 
decades to use BN instead of conventional QRA techniques such as FT and ET [17, 18, 20, 21, 
28-30]. 
3. Application of the methodology  
3.1. Case study 
To see the influence of the inclusion of accident risk analysis in LCA of different 
products/processes, we consider a hypothetical power plant in Holyrood in Newfoundland, 
Canada, which can operate using either LNG or HFO as the power plant fuel. After each fuel 
supply chain to the power plant is determined, LCA and QRA will be performed for specific 
stages along the supply chains. Theses specific stages should include the ones with most 
potential risk of accident and GHG emission. It should be noted that in order to simplify the last 
stage of the fossil fuel life cycles, that is, combustion in power plant, is excluded for the both 
fuels in the present study. Figures 3 and 4 illustrate the activities considered in ARBLCA of 





3.2. Life-Cycle Assessment 
Holyrood thermal station at the maximum is able to produce three billion kilowatt-hours of 
electricity per year [50]. This electricity amount is used as a basis for required calculations in the 
GHG emission LCA of LNG and HFO. For further calculations in LCA, heat rates (energy 
conversion efficiency) of 10,924 kJ/kWh and 10,903 kJ/kWh are assumed to be the power plant 
heat rates when it is fueled with LNG and HFO, respectively [31].  
In the present study, only GHG emissions, among other emissions and environmental impacts 
during the life-cycle, are considered in the LCA phase. In this study, GHG emissions are 
reported on a common mass basis of carbon dioxide equivalents (CO2e) using the global 
warming potential (GWP) of each gas from the Fifth Assessment Report (AR5) of 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in 2013 [32]. Table 1 shows the GWPs used 
for the GHGs inventories in the current study. All GHG results in this report are expressed as 
100-year GWPs unless specified otherwise. 
3.2.1. LCA of LNG 
LNG is a colourless and odourless liquid, which is made by cooling NG to a temperature of 
about -160 ℃ at atmospheric pressure. The liquefaction process reduces NG volume to one six 
hundredth of its original volume, making it feasible to transport over long distances [33]. Using a 
NG heating value of 38.3 MJ/m3 [34] and a density of 0.67 kg/m3 [34], the total amount of NG 
required to generate 3 billion kilowatt hours of electricity can be estimated as 576,098,597 kg 
using the equation below [35]: 
𝐴𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙 𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑑 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑘𝑊ℎ =
𝑝𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟  𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑡  ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑡  𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒  (𝐽𝑜𝑢𝑙𝑒 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑘𝑊ℎ)
𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙  ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑡  𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡  (𝐽𝑜𝑢𝑙𝑒 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑢𝑏𝑖𝑐 𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑟)
          (8)  
An LNG plant is supposed to be developed in Goldboro in Nova Scotia, Canada, by 2018 [51]; 
thus, we assume that LNG fuel required for the power plant in Holyrood, Newfoundland, can be 
provided from Goldboro. After being extracted and processed at Thebaud platform, located 
offshore Nova Scotia, the NG is transported through apipeline to the Goldboro plant. NG is then 




Holyrood by ship, stored, and then re-gasified in a re-gasification terminal. Finally, the gas is 
sent to the hypothetical power plant in Holyrood via pipeline.  
It is assumed that the regasification plant is near the power plant, so that emissions associated 
with NG transportation to the power plant are negligible. Furthermore, as LNG storage has 
insignificant emissions when compared to the other stages, it will not be considered in the LCA 
in the present work. The sequence of the foregoing processes considered in the LCA of LNG is 
depicted in the left-hand side block of Figure 3. It is worth mentioning that the results and 
assumptions of the National Energy Technology Laboratory (NETL) inventory [7] for 
conventional offshore gas are those which have mostly been used for the LCA of LNG in the 
present study. 
3.2.1.1. Natural gas extraction 
Extraction of NG is the first section in the LCA of LNG and depending on the well type. This 
section can include sub-sections such as well construction and installation, well completion, 
liquid unloading, and workovers. These activities all result in GHG emissions either by energy 
combustion or by gas release occurring during the operations. Another key source of GHG 
emission, which contributes to almost all sections of LCA, is fugitive emissions from the 
operational equipment. The emission sources accounted for NG extraction in this study include 
well completion, gas venting from wet seal degassing, and fugitives from the equipment.  
The emission related to well completion is the NG release that occurs during a well development, 
before equipment have been installed for NG recovery. Well completion causes a significant 
amount of GHG emission although it is not a part of daily operations. The methane emission 
from the completion of a conventional well is based on emission factor developed by EPA: 36.65 
Mcf of methane per completion [7]. The emission factor for wet seal degassing accounts for the 
NG lost during the regeneration of wet seal oil, which is used for centrifugal compressors. In this 
study, we use the emission factor calculated by NETL, which is based on sampled venting 
emissions from 15 offshore platforms by EPA, and production rate of a year in the US. This 
emission factor is 0.0069 m3 of vented gas per cubic meter of produced NG [7]. The fugitive 
emissions considered in this study include two sorts of emissions; the emissions that can be and 




pneumatic valves and other process control systems. The emission factor for these devices, 
which is estimated to be similar to that of wet seal degassing, is 1.95 E -06 kg of methane per kg 
of produced NG [7]. Likewise, gas released from mishaps and equipment such as separators and 
pumps cannot be captured for flaring. NG is also released from wellhead and equipment like 
heaters and blowdown vessel, which can be captured for flaring. For conventional wells, 51% of 
these emissions are flared, while the balance is vented to the atmosphere [7]. Table 2 shows the 
emission factors for fugitive emissions from extraction section. The emission factors for 
unprocessed NG flaring based on API [34] are shown in Table 3. 
 
3.2.1.2. Natural gas processing 
To meet pipeline quality, raw NG must be cleaned from contaminants such as water, carbon 
dioxide, and hydrogen sulfide (H2S). This is a pre-treatment of raw NG at extraction site since a 
complete process is usually done at a processing or liquefaction plant. This process takes place 
through different operations depending on the NG type. In this study, we consider key processing 
operations including acid gas removal (AGR) and dehydration. 
Amine-based processes are technologies widely used in AGR. The energy combustion by an 
amine reboiler is the major source of GHG emissions in AGR process. In order to estimate GHG 
emissions by amine reboiler, EPA emission factors for industrial boilers [16], which are fuelled 
by NG, are applied in this study. In addition to the emissions resulting from the energy 
combustion, a portion of CH4 absorbed by amine solution and naturally-occurring CO2 in raw 
NG are vented to the atmosphere [7]. Table 4 shows the emission factors for AGR process. 
 
 
Glycol dehydration is the most common method of water removal from raw NG. Similar to AGR 
process, GHG emissions from dehydration operations include fuel combustion and venting 
emissions. Reboiler, which here is assumed to be heated by NG combustion, is the only 
equipment in the dehydration system that consumes fuel. In addition to absorbing water, the 




methane during the process; nonetheless, small amounts of it are vented from dehydrators [7]. 
Table 5 shows the emission factors for dehydration operation.  
3.2.1.3. Natural gas transportation (pipeline) 
This study assumes that NG, after extraction and process in offshore oil field, is transported to 
Goldboro LNG plant by pipeline. Most emissions related to NG transportation are produced due 
to energy combustion by compressors used to increase NG pressure. The energy required for 
compressor operations is based on a comparison between power requirements and compression 
ratios. This analysis assumes that the inlet pressure to compressors at the NG extraction and 
processing site is 345 kPa while the outlet pressure is 5516 kPa, a standard pressure for pipeline 
transportation of NG. 
Gas powered centrifugal compressors are commonly used at offshore NG extraction sites. A two-
stage centrifugal compressor with an inlet pressure of 345 kPa and an outlet pressure of 5516 kPa 
has a power requirement of 5 watts per m3 of NG [36]. The GHG emission for the operation of a 
wellhead centrifugal compressor is shown in Table 6. 
The pipeline distance in the present study was estimated as 225 km, which is the approximate 
distance between the extraction field and the location of the hypothetical LNG plant. To keep the 
desired NG pressure, compressor stations are necessary every 80 to 160 kilometers along the 
pipelines. Therefore, it is assumed that there are two compressor stations along the pipeline; the 
amount of GHG emissions associated with each station is 30% of the total emission produced by 
the wellhead compressor. 
3.2.1.4. Natural gas liquefaction  
NG that arrives at a LNG plant, prior to liquefaction, is further treated in order to remove any 
residual water, sulfur-containing species, and CO2 that might still be presented after the pre-
processing. Moreover, other components that could freeze under the low temperatures (e.g. 
benzene) during liquefaction are removed as well as those which could be harmful to the 
liquefaction facility (e.g. mercury). The liquefaction process entails chilling the cleaned NG 
using refrigerants. Going through stages of pre-cooling, liquefaction and sub-cooling, the NG 




pressure. GHG emissions associated with the liquefaction process are mainly due to the fuel gas 
combustion needed for power refrigeration compressors and electrical generators, fired heaters, 
flares, incinerators, venting of CO2, and fugitive emissions in the process [37].  
A few studies have been conducted to quantify the amount of GHG emissions from LNG plants. 
From those, an estimation of 64 kg CO2 e/MWh by NETL [52] was selected for the liquefaction 
GHG emissions in the present analysis. 
3.2.1.5. LNG transportation 
LNG is transported by specially designed marine tankers delivering their load to receiving 
terminals. The main source of GHG emissions in LNG tankers (ships) is the fuel combustion 
needed to power their propulsion systems. Hence, emissions from LNG transportation relates to 
the volume of LNG transported and the distance travelled by ships. It is assumed that boil-off 
gases (BOG) from the vessels are either consumed as fuel in engines or liquefied and returned to 
the ship tanks.  
Jaramillo et al. [38] conducted a comparative study of LNG, coal, and gas life-cycle carbon 
emissions, and used Equation (9) for estimation of LNG carriers. Their formula was adapted in 
this study to estimate LNG tankers GHG emissions. Furthermore, the distance travelled by the 
LNG tankers was estimated, using Google Maps, as 1000 km. 
𝐸𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 =











      (9) 
 
where EF is the tanker emission factor of 3,200 kg CO2/ton of fuel consumed; 2 is the number of 
trips each tanker does for delivery of each load; LNGx is the amount of NG (in cubic meters) 
brought from each country; TC is the tanker capacity in cubic meters of natural gas (assumed to 
be 120,000 m3 of LNG); Dx is the distance from each country; TS is the tanker speed of 14 knots; 
FC is a fuel consumption of 41 tons of fuel per day; 24 is the number of hours in a day; and 
LNGt is the total volume of LNG [39]. 




Regasification plants, generally incorporated into LNG receiving terminals, return the LNG back 
to its gaseous state. In regasification plants, LNG is initially pumped from the ships into the 
terminal LNG storage tanks. Then, LNG is either loaded onto trucks for transport to smaller 
consumers’ locations, or pumped to higher pressure through high pressure pumps, vaporized to 
higher pressure and entered into the transmission and distribution pipeline systems. In a 
regasification LNG terminal, GHG emission sources include: methane leakage from equipment 
such as flanges, valves, compressors and pumps, venting emissions from LNG pumps during 
maintenance, flaring of BOG from storage tanks during ship unloading (if BOG rate exceeds 
BOG compressor capacity), emissions from fuel combustion used for the vaporization process, 
and venting from the vaporization process and from BOG compressors during maintenance [37]. 
The estimation of 20 kg CO2 e/MWh by NETL [52] was selected for the GHG emissions related 
to the regasification plant in this study.  
3.2.2. LCA of HFO 
HFO is a high-viscosity residual oil that remains after the distillate fuel oils and lighter 
hydrocarbons are distilled off in refinery operations. HFO is a refinerys’ cheapest product, used 
for the production of electric power, space heating, vessel bunkering, and various industrial 
purposes [40]. 
Using a HFO heat content of 6633 kJ/barrel [41], the total amount of HFO required to generate 3 
billion kilowatt hours of electricity in the Holyrood power plant is estimated to be 4,929,000 
barrels using Equation (8). According to American Petroleum Institute (API), based on the 
average of yields for US refineries in 2005, 1.7 gallons of HFO are obtained from one barrel (42 
gallons) of crude oil. Therefore, approximately 121,775,300 barrels of crude oil are needed to 
produce 4,929,000 barrels of HFO. 
The required oil fuel for the Holyrood thermal plant is supplied by Philips 66 Company, which is 
an American company with no refinery in Canada. Thus, in this study, the origin of oil fuel has 
been considered in the Gulf of Mexico, the U.S.A. It is supposed that the crude oil extracted 
from the Mars platform in the Gulf is transported by ships to one of Philips 66’s refineries, the 




stored, and then shipped to Holyrood thermal plant by ship tankers. The sequence of the 
aforementioned processes is depicted in the left-hand side block in Figure 4. 
 
 
3.2.2.1. Crude oil recovery 
Crude oil recovery is the first section of HFO life-cycle assessment, and includes well drilling, 
crude oil extraction, and crude oil processing. Rahman et al. [42] quantified the GHG emissions 
from the recovery of five North American conventional crude oils. One crude oil included in 
their analysis was Mars crude oil, extracted from the Mars platform which is used in this study as 
the crude oil extraction site. Rahman et al. [42] estimated air emissions associated with crude oil 
recovery operations such as well drilling, crude oil extraction, crude oil processing, and also 
emissions from venting, flaring, fugitives, and land-use change. Among these emissions, crude 
oil extraction, crude oil processing, and emissions from venting, flaring and fugitives were taken 
into account in the present study. 
Crude oil extraction consists of a number of steps in order to raise the crude oil from the 
reservoir to the surface. Extraction of crude oil consumes a large amount of energy that 
consequently results in large GHG emissions. It is worthwhile mentioning that this energy is 
mainly used by recovery techniques – primary, secondary, and enhanced methods – applied to 
increase the production of the oil reservoir. In the primary method where extraction is at the 
early stages, the reservoir pressure is enough to flow the oil through the production well; 
although, artificial lift technologies such as pumps are used when the pressure drops within the 
reservoir. Aging the reservoir and consequent decrease of the pressure make it necessary to use 
the secondary method, such that water/gas is injected into the reservoir to boost the reservoir 
pressure for production. Further, the enhanced recovery method including thermal recovery 
(steam injection), gas injection (i.e., natural gas, nitrogen, carbon dioxide), and chemical 
injection (i.e., polymers and detergent) is used to mobilize the remaining oil. Rahman et al. [42] 
calculated GHG emissions of crude oil extraction based on basic energy combustion equations 
for pumps, compressors, and other electric equipment. The emission from the Mars crude oil was 




Being mixed with water and gas after extraction, the crude oil needs processing to meet 
transportation quality requirements. The energy consumption needed to remove and treat these 
phases contributes to GHG emission. A gravity separator is usually used to separate oil, gas, and 
water, which is not a significant source of GHG emission. Natural gas-fired reboilers providing 
the heat required for crude oil stabilization, and pumps are considered as main causes of 
emissions for stabilizing crude oil. Treatment of associated gas using an amine treater and a 
glycol dehydrator is the next step in crude oil processing.  This has  already been explained in 
NG processing (see Section 3.2.1.2). The water that comes out of the reservoir along with the 
crude oil, must meet environmental regulations before discharge. Therefore, the last step of crude 
oil processing entails treatment of the water associated with crude oil. This treatment, which is 
energy consuming and a source of GHG emission, includes reduction of oil, grease, sodium, and 
TDS (total dissolved solids) in water. The emission factor for Mars crude oil processing 
estimated by Rahman et al. [42] is 0.79 g-CO2 e/MJ. 
Venting – release of associated NG – and flaring – combustion of associated NG – are inevitable 
sources of GHG emissions in extraction sites. Venting and flaring may occur during emergency 
operations and are necessary where a stream of NG cannot be safely or economically recovered. 
The flaring combustion product of NG includes carbon dioxide, methane, and nitrous oxide. The 
mass composition of unprocessed NG, used in this study to model NG flaring, is 78.3% CH4, 
1.51% CO2, 1.77% nitrogen, and 17.8% non-methane hydrocarbons [43]. The emission factors 
for unprocessed NG flaring are shown in Table 3.  
The leakage of NG through equipment such as valves, pumps, compressors, and other devices 
during extraction and processing operations is called fugitive emissions. These emissions usually 
cannot be captured for flaring due to economic limitations [7,42]. Rahman et al. [42] estimated 
venting, flaring, and fugitive volumes to be 1.33, 0.78, and 0.21 m3 of NG per m3 of crude oil 
extracted, respectably. 
3.2.2.2. Crude oil transportation 
Transportation of crude oil by ocean is generally done through subsea pipelines or ocean tankers. 
In this study, marine tankers are considered to transport both the crude oil from the producing 




among the major sources of GHG emissions in the world. This is primarily due to the large 
quantity of fuel, mostly residual fuel oil, consumed by engines to propel the vessels. GHG 
emission associated with maritime vessels is highly debated, and many studies have been 
conducted to evaluate their impacts. In this study, the approach of Clarkson [44] is adopted. That 
is, ocean oil tankers with slow-speed diesel main engine, medium-speed diesel auxiliary engine, 
and a capacity of 700,000 barrels are considered for both crude oil and HFO transportation. 
There is a difference between crude oil and HFO densities, which in turn affects the volume of 
the liquids transported by each marine tanker trip. Because this difference is insignificant, we 
assume that the amounts of crude oil and HFO transported in each trip are the same. The ocean 
tankers specifications are listed in Table 7. 
 
The emissions produced by main and auxiliary engines are calculated separately. The load factor 
for the main engine in each mode is calculated based upon the propeller law relationship 
equation [45]. Since the vessels do not operate at 100% maximum continuous rating (MCR), the 
correction of 0.83 is added for compensation [46]. 
 
𝐿𝐹 = 0.83 × (
𝐴𝑆
𝑆𝑆
)3          (10) 
 
where LF is load factor; AS is actual speed of the vessel, and SS is the service speed of the vessel. 
In order to calculate the vessel emissions, individual emission factors are required for each 
pollutant being investigated. Emission factors suggested by Goldsworthy & Renilson [47] were 




The amount of emissions produced by both the main and auxiliary engines is then calculated 
using Equation 6, proposed by Corbett et al [48]. 
 
𝐸 =  
𝑃×𝐿𝐹×𝐴×𝐸𝐹
1000




where E is the amount of emission in kg; P is the installed power of engine; A is the time of 
operation in that mode, and EF is the emission factor in g/kWh. The distances were estimated as 
200 kms from the oil field to the refinery, and 4,500 kms from the refinery to the power plant 
using Google Map. 
3.2.2.3. Crude oil refining  
After crude oil arrives at the refinery, it is refined (i.e. separated into smaller fractions) to 
produce various petroleum products. Refineries are considered one of the largest GHG-emission 
sources in industrial activities around the world, mainly because of their vast amount of energy 
consumption. Rahman et al. [49] developed a refinery model in HYSYS to quantify the energy 
consumption in each process unit of the refinery. The amount of energy consumed and the 
volume of the final products produced in the refinery were used as inputs to a spreadsheet-based 
model, FUNNELGHG-CCO, which traces energy combustion and quantifies GHG emissions 
associated with each final product.  
They ran the model for different crude oils to process 150,000 barrels per day. Considering that 
electricity, heat, and steam are required for the refinery processing unit, it was assumed that NG 
is used to produce the heat and steam. To calculate the amount of NG required for heating and 
steam production, the heater and boiler efficiencies were taken as 80% and 75%, respectively. 
The total GHG emissions were determined from the amount of NG, required electricity, and 
emission factors for the combustion of NG and grid electricity. The model estimated the 
emission associated with the Mars crude oil refining to be 7.97 E 09 gr-CO2 equivalents per day. 
3.3. Accident Risk Assessment 
In order for a holistic risk assessment, the risks of potential fires and explosions for likely 
releases of LNG and HFO should be calculated at different stages from extraction at offshore 
drilling rigs to consumption at the power plant. For this purpose, we employ BN technique to 
analyze the root causes of unwanted releases of flammable materials LNG and HFO while ET 






3.3.1. LNG life-cycle risk assessment 
The sequence of the processes which will be considered in the risk assessment of LNG life-cycle 
is depicted in the right-hand side block of Figure 3. 
3.3.1.1. Natural gas extraction  
As can be seen from Figure 3, the first process considered in risk analysis of LNG life-cycle in 
this study is the extraction of NG at the offshore drilling rig. Assuming an overbalanced drilling, 
an undesired kick and the ensuing blowout are considered as the most likely release scenario 
[17,25]. The developed BN of an undesired kick and the ET of the evolution of the kick to a 
blowout have been displayed in Figures 5 and 6, respectively. 
 
3.3.1.2. Natural gas transportation (pipeline) 
After being extracted at the Thebaud platform, NG is transported ashore via subsea pipeline. The 
pipe rupture can then be considered as the most likely release scenario as shown in the BN of 
Figure A-1 (see Appendix A). Based on the function/malfunction of the safety measures in place, 
the consequences of a pipe rupture can be investigated using the ET as shown in Figure A-2. 
 
3.3.1.3. Natural gas liquefaction  
The natural gas which is transported ashore should be liquefied for ease of storage and 
transportation. The root causes of a gas release scenario have been displayed in the BN of Figure 
A-3, and the corresponding ET to investigate the likely consequences of such gas releases have 
been depicted in Figure A-4. 
 
3.3.1.4. LNG storage 
After being liquefied, LNG is stored in LNG storage tanks. These storage tanks can store LNG at 
the very low temperature of -162 °C usually due to their double-container structure. The inner 
container contains LNG while the outer one contains insulation materials. In LNG storage tanks 
if LNG vapor is not released, the pressure and temperature within the tank will increase which 
can thus lead to a tank explosion. LNG is a cryogen, and is kept in its liquid state at very low 




constant by allowing the boil off gas to escape from the tank. This is known as auto-refrigeration. 
The BN in Figure A-5 illustrates the root causes which can result in a gas release. The 
consequences of such a release are shown using the ET in Figure A-6. 
 
3.3.1.5. LNG transportation (shipping) 
The LNG stored at Goldboro Plant, Nova Scotia, is shipped by marine tankers to Holyrood, 
Newfoundland. The major accident scenarios which could result in an LNG release consist of 
either damage to the tanks or accidents which threaten the ship’s physical/operational integrity. 
BN developed in Figures A-7 displays the root causes of such accident scenarios. Likewise, the 
likely outcomes of such an LNG release can be represented as the ET in Figure A-6. 
 
3.3.1.6. LNG re-gasification 
In order to be used as a fuel, LNG should be returned to its gaseous state via re-gasification 
process. In a conventional re-gasification plant, LNG is heated by sea water to convert it to 
NG/methane gas. The root causes of an undesired gas release during the re-gasification process 
have been depicted in Figure A-8. The ET of Figure A-4 can also be used to analyze potential 
accidents.  
 
3.3.2. HFO life-cycle risk assessment 
The sequence of the processes which will be considered in risk analysis of HFO life-cycle is 
depicted in the right-hand side block of Figure 4. 
 
3.3.2.1. Crude oil extraction 
In the present study, the extraction of both NG and crude oil is conducted using offshore drilling 
platforms. As such, assuming an overbalanced drilling operation, the root causes of a kick as the 
most likely release scenario and the potential blowout can be modeled using the same BN and 
ET as developed in Figures 5 and 6, respectively. 
 
3.3.2.2. Crude oil transportation (shipping) 
After being extracted from the Gulf of Mexico, crude oil is transported to the  Alliance refinery 




depicted in BN of Figure A-9. The likely outcomes of such accident are shown in ET of Figure 
A-10. 
 
3.3.2.3. Crude oil storage 
After arriving at the refinery, the crude is stored in storage tanks before being refined into 
products of interest. Storage tanks come in different sizes and shapes with special applications 
requiring tanks to be rectangular, vertical or horizontal cylinders, or even spherical. Horizontal 
cylinders and spheres are generally used for pressurized storage of hydrocarbon or chemical 
products. For crude oil and its products, however, the atmospheric or low-pressure storage tanks 
are usually used being vertical cylindrical in shape with fixed or floating roofs. The BN for an 
unwanted release of fuel oil from the storage tanks is illustrated in Figure A-11. The ET of 
Figure A-10 can be used to investigate the potential consequences of such an accident. 
 
3.3.2.4. Crude oil refining 
In the Alliance Refinery, the crude oil is then processed and refined in order to be converted into 
more useful products such as petroleum naphtha, gasoline, diesel, asphalt base, heating oil, 
kerosene and liquefied petroleum gas (LPG). Generally, crude oil is heated and changed into a 
gas using a fired boiler (furnace). The hot gases are passed into the bottom of a distillation 
column and become cooler as they move up the column. As the gases cool below their boiling 
point, they condense into a liquid. The liquids are then drawn off the distillation column at 
specific heights, ranging from heavy residuals at the bottom, raw diesel fuels in the mid-sections, 
and raw gasoline at the top. These raw fractions are then processed further to make several 
different finished products. 
Considering a distillation column, a furnace, and a heat exchanger as the major hazard 
installations in the refinery, a BN for unwanted release of flammable materials from these have 
been developed as depicted in Figure A-12. The likely consequences which such a release can 
pose are presented in the ET of Figure A-13. 
3.3.2.5. HFO transportation (shipping)  
The HFO produced in the Alliance refinery is then transported to the Hollyrood thermal station. 




root causes of a hydrocarbon release and likely consequences can be presented using the same 
BN and ET as developed in Figures A-9 and A-10, respectively.  
 
4. Results and Discussion  
4.1. Comparison of life-cycle emissions  
Based on the total volume of the fossil fuels required by the Hollyrood power plant to generate 
annual electricity, the emission factors and the life-cycle GHG emissions were estimated for both 
LNG and HFO.  
These emissions in the form of CO2 equivalent (tons CO2 e) are presented in Tables 9 and 10 for 
LNG and HFO, respectively. However, it should be noted that due to the generic data and the 
emission factors mainly extracted from the literatures and also the simplified assumptions made 
in the calculations of life cycle emissions, there is a high level of uncertainty in the results of the 
present study. The results of the LCA indicate that the total GHG emissions produced throughout 
HFO life-cycle (8,460,180 tons CO2 e) are considerably higher than those of LNG (488,437 tons 
CO2 e), which is in accordance with previous studies [8].  
The difference between the emissions of HFO and LNG is partly due to the different  processes 
considered in the life-cycle of each fuel and partly due to different parameters even in cases of 
similar processes. For example, comparing the emissions in the domain of transportation, not 
only the distances in which the LNG (~225 km) and HFO (~ 4700 km) are transported are 
different but also the modes of transportation for the fuels  differ (e.g., LNG pipeline vs. HFO 
marine tankers). In the HFO life-cycles, the most GHG emission is related to the refinery stage 
(76%) whereas in the case of LNG, it is assigned to the liquefaction plant (40%).  
For the sake of better comparison of the two fuels, the total emissions can be converted into 
monetary values. To this end, the British Colombia province carbon tax – defined as a tax based 
on GHG generation – which is 30 CAD per metric ton of CO2 equivalent (in year 2012) is 
considered in the present study. The results have been presented as carbon tax in Tables 9 and 
10. As can be noted, the carbon tax of HFO is about 17 times greater than that of LNG, making 
the latter a  more economical (and cleaner) fuel than the former.  
4.2. Comparison of safety risks  
The probabilities assigned to the root nodes of the BNs and to the safety barriers of the ET for 




probabilities are either extracted from the literature or estimated by subject matter experts [53-
67]. By calculating the top event probabilities (hydrocarbon release) in each BN, the 
probabilities of the corresponding consequences can also be estimated. The risk of each 
consequence is then calculated as the product of the probability of the consequence and the 
envisaged loss values, expressed in monetary units. Table 11 presents the respective loss values 
used in the present study [59]. As the LCAs were conducted on an annual basis, for the sake of 






The risks assessed for the LNG and HFO life-cycles are presented in Tables 12 and 13, 
respectively. As can be seen, LNG life-cycle has a significantly lower risk (~ 2.5 million CAD) 
than that of HFO life-cycle (~ 5.6 million CAD). In LNG life-cycle, the liquefaction (57.5%) and 
re-gasification (41%) processes contribute the most to the safety risk whereas in HFO life-cycle, 
the oil refinery (99.5%) accounts for nearly the entire safety risk, mostly due to the occurrence of 
major accidents such as fires and explosions. In Figure 7, the total amounts of losses, due to both 
the emissions and safety risks, of both fuels have been depicted. As can be seen, in terms of both 
emission and safety risk, LNG can be chosen as a safer and cleaner fuel. Regarding the HFO, the 
amount of safety risk does not compare to the amount of environmental emission (the safety risk 
is ~ 2% of the total losses); however, in the case of LNG, the safety risk accounts for about 17% 
of the total losses, which is quite notable.  
Nevertheless, it should be noted that in the present study, the emissions that resulted from the 
combustion of fuels due to their accidental release, particularly fires and explosions, have been 





In the present work, we introduced a methodology for risk-based life-cycle assessment 




the entire life-cycles of a product. For this purpose, the emissions of greenhouse gases to the 
atmosphere were calculated, converted into CO2 equivalent, and then quantified to monetary 
values based on a carbon tax imposed by government. Likewise, the safety risks resulted from 
undesired releases of fuels and the ensuing fires and explosions were calculated using 
quantitative risk analysis techniques such as ET and BN throughout the processes involved in the 
life-cycle of fuels.  
We exemplified the application of the methodology to LNG and HFO as the fuels of a fossil-fuel 
power plant in Newfoundland, Canada, so that the fuel with the lesser total loss can be 
determined. Considering the emissions and risks throughout the respective life cycles, it was 
demonstrated that not only is LNG by far a cleaner fuel than HFO (17 times less emissions), but 
also a safer alternative than HFO. In the present study, the inclusion of safety risks in the life-
cycle risk assessment of LNG and HFO did not affect the preference of the fuels that could have 
been determined solely based on their environmental emissions. Nonetheless, it was 
demonstrated that in some cases, the safety risks can make a significant contribution to the total 
number of losses (e.g., about 17% in the case of LNG in this study) which in slightly different 
situations can lead to quite different priorities in deciding safer and/or cleaner fuel alternatives.  
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Table 1. IPCC Global Warming Potentials 
GHG 
AR5 (IPCC 2013) 
20-year 100-year 
CO2 1 1 
CH4 85 30 




Table 2. Emission factors for fugitive emissions during extraction 
NG extraction emission source Value Unit 
Fugitive emissions (captured for flaring) 3.90 E -05 kg CH4/kg NG extracted 
Fugitive emissions (not captured for flaring) 2.41 E -04 kg CH4/kg NG extracted 
Valve fugitive emissions (including pneumatic devices) 1.95 E -06 kg CH4/kg NG extracted 
 
Table 3. Unprocessed Natural Gas Flaring Emissions 
Pollutant Value Unit 
CO2 2.67 lb CO2/lb flared NG 
N2O 8.95 E -05 lb N2O/lb flared NG 






Table 4. Emission factors for AGR process 
Flow Name Value Unit 
CO2 (combustion) 6.47 E -04 kg CO2/kg NG product 
CO2 (vented) 1.30 E -02 kg CO2/kg NG product 
N2O 3.54 E -06 kg N2O/kg NG product 
CH4 (combustion) 1.27 E -05 kg CH4/ kg NG product 
CH4 (vented) 9.71 E -04 kg CH4/ kg NG product 
 
 
Table 5. Emission factors for dehydration 
Flow Name Value Unit 
CO2 4.24 E -04 kg CO2/kg NG product 
N2O 2.26 E -09 kg N2O/kg NG product 
CH4 (combustion) 8.10 E -09 kg CH4/ kg NG product 




Table 6. Centrifugal compressor emission factors 
Pollutant Value Unit 
CO2 8.80 E -02 kg CO2/kg NG 
CH4 6.89 E -06 kg CH4/kg NG 






Table 7. Oil tanker specification 
Average service speed  Maximum  speed  Average main engine power Average Aux engine power 





Table 8. Emission factors of marine tanker (g/kWh) 
Engine type N2O CO2 CH4 
Main (SSD) 0.031 622 0.006 





Table 9. GHG emissions associated with LNG life-cycle. 
Emission Source Emission (Tons CO2 e) Contribution (%) 
NG Extraction 123,838 25 
NG Processing 25,787 5 
NG Pipeline 81,891 17 
NG Liquefaction 192,000 40 
LNG Carrier 4,920 1 
Re-gasification 60,000 12 
Total 488,437  
Carbon Tax ($) 14,653,135  
 
 
Table 10. GHG emissions associated with HFO life-cycle. 
Emission Source Emission (Tons CO2 e) Contribution (%) 
Crude Oil Extraction 938,910 11 
Crude Oil Processing 588,690 7 
Venting, Flaring and Fugitives 441,450 5 
Oil Tanker (oil field to refinery) 10,530 0.5 
Oil Refinery 6,470,100 76 
Oil Tanker (refinery to power plant) 10,500 0.5 

















Asset loss Human loss Environmental loss Reputation loss 
1 < 1 k Not significant No injury No remediation required Noticed by operating unit 
2 1 K - 10 K Short term production interruption 
Minor injury, first aid 
attention required 
Around the operating 
unit; easy recovery and 
remediation 
Noticed in the operation 
line/ line supervisor,  
3 
10 K - 500 
K 
Damage of one unit, requiring 
repair; medium term production 
interruption 
One injury, requiring 
hospitalization;  no life 
threat 
Around the operating 
line; easy recovery and 
remediation 
Noticed in plant 
4 
500 K - 5 
M 
Damage of more than one unit' 
requiring repair/long term 
production interruption 
More than one  injury, 
requiring hospitalization; no 
life threat 
Within plant; short term 
remediation effort 
Local media coverage 
5 5 M - 50 M Loss of one operating unit/product 
Multiple major injuries, 
potential disabilities, 
potential life threat 
Minor offsite impact; 
remediation cost < 1 M  
Regional media coverage; 
brief note on national 
media 
6 
50 M- 500 
M 
Loss of a major portion of facility/ 
product 
One fatality and/or multiple 
injuries with disabilities 
Community alerted; 
remediation cost < 5 M 
National media coverage; 
brief note on international 
media 
7 > 500 M Total loss of facility/products Multiple fatalities 
Community evacuation; 
remediation cost > 5 M  
National media coverage, 








Table 12. Risks related to the LNG life-cycle 
Stage Risk ($) Contribution (%) 
Drilling 13,334.36 0.5  
NG Pipeline  10,527.42 0.4 
NG Liquefaction 1,426,205.86 57.5 
LNG Storage 50.82 0.002 
LNG Shipping 6,652.77 0.3 
Re-gasification 1,019,426.91 41 
Total 2,476,198.17  
 
 
Table 13. Risks related to the HFO life-cycle 
Stage Risk ($) Contribution 
Drilling 13,334.36 0.25 
Oil Shipping 7,316.68 0.13 
Oil Storage 17.60 0.0003 
Oil Refinery 5,551,074.76 99.5 
HFO Shipping 7,316.68 0.13 









Table 1-B. Root causes probabilities used for LNG risk analysis. 
No. Root Cause Probability No. Root Cause Probability 
Extraction LNG Shipping 
1  Annular losses 1.00E-02 46 Engine room 9.50E-03 
2  Riser rupture 1.00E-02  47 Cargo handling module 1.20E-04 
3  Temperature effects 2.50E-03  48 Boiler 2.30E-04 
4  Gas-cut mud 7.00E-03  49 Lightning  3.40E-02 
5  Failure of density meter 2.00E-04  50 Heavy Sea Conditions  3.20E-03 
6  Operator error in mixing density 3.00E-02  51 Storm 8.73E-02 
7  Pump failure 4.00E-02  52 Tsunami  2.39E-02 
8  Power failure 2.70E-04  53 Transfer Arm Release 7.80E-03 









Table 2-B. Root causes probabilities used for HFO risk assessment. 
  
10  Efficient hydrocarbon formation 1.25E-01  55 Radar system failure 1.00E-03 
NG Liquefaction  56 Steering system failure 5.20E-04 
11 Absorber Leakage  2.00E-04  57 Human Error 1.30E-03 
12 Regenerator Leakage 1.80E-03  58 Environmental factors 1.00E-03 
13 Reboiler Leakage 3.00E-04  59 Navigational Error 4.10E-04 
14 Pump Leakage 6.00E-03  60 Iceberg 2.32E-04 
15 Valves/Joints 2.30E-04  61 Platforms 6.70E-05 
16 Tank Leakage 1.00E-04  62 Dropped objects 2.80E-03 
17 Compressor Leakage 1.40E-05  63 Anchoring Failure 3.20E-04 
18 Flash Leakage 5.00E-04  64 Propulsion system failure 7.00E-04 
19 HEX Leakage 1.00E-02  65 Radar system failure 1.00E-03 
20 C-SCRUB Column 2.80E-05  66 Steering system failure 5.20E-04 
21 N-Column Leakage 3.00E-03  67 Tug boat Error 1.20E-04 
LNG Storage Tank  68 Uncharted obstacles 5.30E-04 
 22 Under Pressurization  2.90E-10 Gas sub-sea pipeline 
 23 Tank reaches vacuum pressure 1.36E-05 69 Manufacturing defects 1.35E-04 
 24 Vacuum PSV fails to open 2.12E-05  70 Material defects 3.44E-03 
 25 Overfilling 1.20E-05  71 welding defects 1.08E-02 
 26 Tank level reaches high level 3.70E-04  72 Malfunction of relief valve 2.59E-04 
 27 LSHH fails to signal 1.00E-03  73 Pigging error 1.09E-02 
 28 Inlet Valve fails to close 3.14E-02  74 Thermal forces 4.20E-03 
 29 Major Mechanical Failures 8.80E-06  75 Hydrodynamic forces 5.16E-04 
 30 Over Pressurization 1.04E-03  76 Ship anchors 2.15E-03 
 31 Rollover  1.00E-03  77 Wear abrasion 8.53E-04 
 32 Boil-Off Gas removal failure 4.10E-05  78 Minor anchors 3.05E-02 
 33 Natural Hazards 1.33E-01  79 Trawls 4.11E-03 
 34 Flood  2.65E-02  80 Corrosive environment 1.00E+00 
 35 Earthquake  2.39E-02  81 Internal coating failure 2.41E-04 
 36 Storm 8.73E-02  82 CO2 2.22E-06 
Re-gasification  83 O2 3.52E-06 
 37 Unloading Arms Leakage 3.40E-07  84 H2S 1.41E-05 
 38 LNG Storage Tank 2.00E-05  85 H2O 1.99E-05 
 39 Compressor  1.40E-05  86 Iceberg 2.32E-04 
 40 Blower  4.20E-04  87 Earthquake 2.39E-02 
 41 Re-liquefier Leakage 2.50E-04  88 Storm 1.69E-02 
 42 Primary Pump Leakage 6.00E-03 
    43 Secondary Pump Leakage 6.00E-03 
    44 Valves / Joints 5.00E-06 
    45 Vaporizers Leakage  3.10E-03 
   
No. Root Cause Probability 
Oil Storage Tank 
1 Maintenance error 3.10E-02 
2 High pressure 1.00E-04 
3 Joining error 4.60E-03 
4 Poor foundation 2.40E-05 







































6 Inlet valve fails to close 2.06E-04 
7 Feeding pump failure 5.00E-04 
8 Level indicator failure 1.70E-05 
9 Corrosion 2.00E-03 
10 Manufacturing defects 1.20E-05 
11 Damage during installation 4.30E-03 
12 Joints/gaskets 2.30E-04 
13 Design error 1.30E-05 
14 Inadequate maintenance 1.20E-03 
15 Monitoring error 3.40E-03 
Oil Refinery 
16 Solids in feed 4.20E-05 
17 Fouling  6.50E-04 
18 Process measuring element failure  1.76E-03 
19 Control valve failure 2.80E-05 
20 Transmission signal failure 1.70E-03 
21 Pump-around failure 5.00E-04 
22 Reflux valve failure 2.80E-05 
23 Condenser failure 2.19E-04 
24 Reflux pump failure 5.00E-04 
25 Closed block valve  3.98E-04 
26 Working boiler 2.60E-04 
27 Design error 1.30E-05 
28 Inadequate maintenance 1.20E-03 
29 Monitoring error 3.40E-03 
30 PSV failure 2.59E-04 
31 Fatigue (Column) 1.50E-04 
32 Corrosion (Column) 2.00E-03 
33 External excessive heat 1.54E-04 
34 Failure of heating fluid feed valve  2.06E-04 
35 Cooling system failure 2.19E-04 
36 Failure of oil feeding valve 2.06E-04 
37 Failure of block valve 3.98E-04 
38 Isolation valve failure  5.90E-05 
39 Relief valve failure 2.59E-04 
40 Rupture disk failure 3.30E-04 
41 Plugging 3.16E-02 
42 Pressure controller failure 1.76E-03 
43 Coke build-up 5.10E-02 
44 Heat controller failure 2.50E-04 
45 Soot blower failure 1.40E-04 
46 Flame impingement 4.20E-03 
47 After burning 3.60E-03 
48 Fatigue (Furnace) 1.57E-04 
49 Corrosion (Furnace) 1.90E-04 




Table 3-B. Safety barrier probabilities used in event trees. 
ID  Safety Barrier Probability 
1  Minor release 8.00E-05 
2  Major release 1.00E-04 
3  Immediate ignition 1.00E-01 
4  Delayed ignition 3.00E-01 
5  Gas detector failure 4.00E-02 
6  Emergency evacuation  2.00E-01 
7  Pressure monitoring  1.00E-03 
8  Automatic shot-off valve 1.00E-02 
9  Alarm 1.00E-02 
10  Manual shot-off valve 3.00E-02 
11  Kick non-detection 8.60E-06 
12  Lower pipe ram 1.00E-04 
13  Upper pipe ram 1.00E-04 
14  Blind/shear ram 1.00E-04 
15  Annular preventer 1.00E-04 
16  Casing 2.00E-04 
 
 
